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Abstract 
 
Abstract: During past few decades, due to financial deregulation, the banking industry experienced 
a considerable amount of consolidation. To study whether members benefit from a merger, we 
examined the impacts of mergers that took place in the U.S. from 2002 to 2015 on operating 
performance (profitability and cost efficiency), average loan and deposit interest rates, credit 
supply and loan portfolio. Employing propensity score matching strategy to mitigate possible 
selection bias, we did not find evidence that mergers provide benefits to members of the acquiring 
credit unions. Compared with the matched non-merging peers, acquiring credit unions obtain less 
improvement on profitability for the first year after the merger and also do not show any 
improvement in cost efficiency. Acquiring credit unions members do not attain any superior 
benefits on interest rates (neither deposit nor lending rate). Moreover, we observe a larger 
contraction in credit supply with a decrease in unsecured credit card loans and real estate loans, 
compared to what is provided by similar credit unions who do not go through mergers in the same 
period. Our study fills the gap of literature by attaching attention to member benefits in credit 
union mergers, especially in the regards of interest rates, credit supply and loan portfolio 
composition. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past few decades, both banks and credit unions experienced a considerable 
amount of consolidation. Wilcox (2006) argued that it became ambiguous for financial 
institutions to distinguish from each other because of the deregulation in the financial 
market, leading to further competitions between them. As a result, financial institutions 
started to merge to survive. Researchers have studied merger effects of commercial banks 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Shaffer, 1993; Berger et al., 1997; Carletti et al., 2001; 
Sapienza, 2002; Prompitak, 2009; Haas et al., 2010; Behr and Heid, 2011; Ogura and 
Uchida, 2013; Beccalli and Frantz, 2013). However, similar attention has not been attached 
to the credit union mergers. 
According to National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the number of credit unions 
in the U.S. shrunk from 10439 in 2000 to 5492 in 2018, where smallest credit unions with 
less than 5 million went through a 79.2% decline. Despite the decrease in the number of 
credit unions, however, the number of members, total deposits and local market shares have 
increased. On average each credit union is expanding in size. Wilcox (2007) argued that 
this decrease in the number of credit unions is mainly attributed to mergers. As such, our 
focus is to study the impacts of a merger on the credit union, specifically on its membership.   
Credit unions, as a financial institution, to a large extent are similar to banks. They take 
deposits, provide loans and offer a broad range of financial products to its customers. 
Taylor (1971) defined credit union as a rather unique social institution which serves both 
as a financial intermediary and as a cooperative. It gathers deposits from the members and 
lends these funds to its members, while it is also owned and operated by members on a 
volunteer basis. While credit unions and banks share a lot of similarities, they differ from 
each other in several ways. A major difference between them is the ownership. Compared 
to banks, credit unions do not have shareholders and they are owned by their members. It 
is the financial consumers themselves who form and join the credit unions and become 
members. They aim to obtain more extensive financial services which they cannot get 
access to otherwise, and/or cannot have these services at a more affordable price. Ever 
  
 
2 
since Jensen and Meckling (1976), influences of organization form on operating 
behaviours have been diffusely accepted, which suggests that the form determines the 
ownership of residual claims and the objective of the organization. Thus, as opposed to 
commercial banks, whose goal is to maximize shareholders’ profits, the primary focus of 
credit unions is to benefit members by meeting their needs of financial services, in 
providing them access to credits, safekeeping their savings and returning profits in form of 
more attractive rates (Bauer, 2007; Goddard et al., 2008). While fee income is becoming 
increasingly important as in commercial banks (DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Abedifar et al, 
2014; etc.), most credit unions would put a priority on providing consumer loans (Fried, 
Lovell and Yaisawarng, 1999; Goddard et al, 2002). As such, credit unions may have 
different strategies for interest rates, credit supply and loan composition from that of 
commercial banks. 
The most probable objectives of credit unions been argued so far are to maximize asset 
growth and/or membership growth, to offer more financial products, or to maximize the 
difference between market savings and loans rates compared with what credit unions 
provide (Fried et al., 1996; Goddard et al., 2002; Smith 1984; Bauer 2008). Smith (1984) 
argued that the key decisions made by management team are the types of loan and savings 
accounts to offer, and the prices and/or quantities of those accounts, which implies that 
management team plays an important role in affecting the asset size. Dopico (2016) 
concluded four most effective ways (except consolidation) for credit unions to grow in size: 
increasing deposit benefits, attaining a higher return on asset, providing richer key financial 
products and making higher market expense contributed most to asset growth. At the same 
time, it is argued that the objective would be different across the sizes of credit unions 
(Goddard et al., 2008). Thus, we propose that merger, as an activity which influences both 
size and management team, should have a great impact on the credit union’s credit supply, 
interest rate and loan composition. 
Previous studies (Fried et al., 1999; Bauer et al., 2009; Dopico and Wilcox, 2010) show 
that, target credit unions have been proved to benefit from mergers where the benefits to 
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credit unions are represented by increase in efficiency score (Fried et al., 1999; Garden and 
Ralston, 1999; Ralston et al., 2001; Worthington, 2001; Bauer et al., 2009). But there is no 
evidence of efficiency gains to acquirers been found. In particular, we were interested to 
know whether the members of the acquiring credit unions benefit from the merger. This is 
particularly interesting for credit union since membership benefits are argued to be the goal 
of the credit unions (Smith, 1984). Member’s benefits can be in the form of better rate 
(deposit/loan rate), access to credit or diversified loan offering. To our best knowledge, 
there is no literature available to study the impact of the merger on interest rates, credit 
supply and loan portfolio of credit unions; i.e. the benefit to the members. There are three 
major stakeholders of a credit union. One is members/owners, the second is the 
management team and the third is regulators and public. As evidenced by Bauer, Miles and 
Nishikawa (2009), regulators benefit from merger activities, indicated by better CAMEL 
ratios. Thus, we attached our main focus on whether members of the acquiring credit union 
benefit from consolidation.  
As such, this study aims to fill the gap to investigate whether the members can benefit from 
a merger, by examining merger effects on performance, interest rates, credit supply and 
loan portfolio, from a perspective of the members of acquirers. We studied mergers that 
took place in the U.S. from 2002 to 2015. By simple comparison between acquirers’ key 
variables before and after the merger, we observe decrease in total loan to asset ratio, 
decrease in new vehicle loans, decrease in other real estate loans, increase in business loans, 
decrease in profitability, increase in cost-to-income ratio, larger size, decrease in average 
loan interest rate, decrease in average deposit interest rate and decrease in net interest 
margin, which are all significant. In our sample, we observed that acquiring credit unions 
are generally larger and more profitable than those who were not involved in any mergers, 
as such a simple comparison may lead to selection bias. To avoid this bias, instead of 
simply comparing merged credit unions with those who didn’t experience a merger, we 
employ propensity score matching method to match every acquiring credit union with a 
similar non-merging peer. We matched them in eight dimensions. We found that, compared 
to similar non-merging counterparts, acquiring credit unions obtained less improvement in 
  
 
4 
profitability one year after the merger while there was no difference in the subsequent year. 
For cost efficiency, we did not observe the difference between the acquirers and similar 
non-merging peers one year and two years after the merger. Merging credit unions do not 
attain superior benefits on interest rates. However, we observed a larger contraction in 
credit supply with a decrease in unsecured credit card loans and real estate loans, compared 
to what similar credit unions offer if they do not go through a merger. To conclude, this 
study does not find support for any superior benefits to members of the acquiring credit 
unions.  
The remainder of this study is constructed as follows. In section 2 we will describe the 
background of credit union sector, and this section illustrates the trend and loan 
composition of recent credit unions, categorized by asset size. In section 3, we summarized 
previous literature with emphasis on credit unions and the merger effects, followed by 
hypothesis development in section 4. In section 5 we explained the data set and constructed 
variables. We also introduced our methodology and regression model in this section. 
Results are shown and discussed in section 6. Finally, we summarized and concluded in 
section 7.  
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2. Background 
2.1. Credit union 
A credit union is a not-for-profit organization and a member-owned financial cooperative, 
operated under the principle of people helping people. Originally from Germany and first 
established in the United States in 1909, credit unions focus on helping their members save 
and borrow at more beneficial rates as well as receive more affordable financial services 
than what they can expect from commercial banks.  
Although similar services are also offered by commercial banks, credit unions differ from 
traditional commercial banks in several regards, including their member ownership, not-
for-profit purpose, and average smaller size. The average credit union holds about $268 
million in assets, while the average bank holds nearly $3.33 billion (CUNA U.S. Credit 
Union Profile, 2019)1. Besides, credit unions are designed to serve people sharing common 
attributes, such as the same geographic locations, similar occupations or membership in a 
certain group. These common attributes provide credit unions with additional soft 
information on their members and members’ financial ability to pay back the loan, which 
makes credit unions able to provide more personalized services. Also, due to credit unions’ 
not-for-profit characteristic, their profits will either be reinvested or given back to members 
through attractive interest rates, instead of going to shareholders (Goddard et al., 2002). 
Thus, unlike banks, maximizing profits of shareholders is not the primary goal for credit 
unions. Meanwhile, Taylor (1971) defined a credit union as a rather unique social 
institution, combining a financial intermediary with a member-owned cooperative, which 
is both a ‘purchasing’ cooperative and a ‘marketing’ one. Smith, Cargill and Meyer (1980) 
argued that, due to the fact that the members are both consumers and owners, credit unions 
cannot simply be applied with the profit-maximizing model, which was used to study 
 
1 U.S. Credit Union Profile, 2019. Retrieved from: 
https://www.cuna.org/uploadedFiles/Global/About_Credit_Unions/NationalProfile-M19-Bank.pdf 
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commercial banks.  
2.2. The recent trend of credit unions 
Despite the differences mentioned above, Fried, Lovell and Yaisawarng (1999) argued that, 
among all the similarities that credit unions and banks share, there is one similarity that is 
worth noting: the urge to merge. In recent decades, the financial market has witnessed 
heavy consolidation. Wilcox (2006) argued that it becomes ambiguous for financial 
institutions to distinguish from each other because of deregulation in the financial market, 
leading to further competitions between them. Accordingly, like banks, credit unions are 
also under the pressure to merge for survival. From historical data, we can notice that 
although the number of credit unions is shrinking, the number of members, total deposits 
and local market shares are expanding. According to National Credit Union Administration 
(NCUA) and Credit Union National Association (CUNA), there were 11,992 federally 
insured credit unions at the end of 1994, while there are only 5,492 in 2018. The decrease 
in the number of credit unions can be attributed to mergers, conversions and liquidations 
(Wilcox, 2007). However, the data showed that credit unions converting to other charters 
from 1997 to 2005 only comprised less than 1% of credit unions while the failure rates 
were also less than 1%. Thus, merger activities are presumed to be the major reason for the 
decreasing number. Figure 2.1 below shows the change in the number of credit unions in 
different asset sizes. We categorized credit unions into nine sizes using the same asset size 
category following McKee and Kagan (2015). 
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Figure 2.1 The change in number of credit unions in different size 
As we can see from Figure 2.1, from 2000 to 2018, credit unions with smaller asset size 
decreased drastically. The number of smallest credit unions with asset less than 5 million 
decreased from 4307 to 896, experiencing a 79.20% decline. In contrast, the larger ones 
experienced a sharp increase. The number of the largest credit unions with asset more than 
1000 million increases from 43 to 311, growing more than six times the original number. 
Meanwhile, the number of medium-size credit unions stays stable, with only 0.28% 
increase during the same time. The decreasing number of small credit unions and the 
increasing number of large credit unions can partially be attributed to the growth of smaller 
credit unions into large ones, primarily due to consolidation. However, as the total number 
of credit unions also reduced drastically during our sample period, from 10439 to 5492, 
merger activities were supposed to be the major reason.  
2.3. The trend of credit unions’ loan portfolio 
The loan is the major asset of banks, thrifts, and other lending institutions. The original 
intention of a credit union is to provide members in similar financial conditions and 
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financial capacity with unsecured credits. Thus, loan provision, among other services, 
should be the most important service in credit unions (McKee and Kagan, 2015). Following 
Dopico (2016), we mainly focused on 7 key loan types defined by him. The 7 key loan 
types are unsecured credit cards, other unsecured loans, new car loans, used car loans, first 
mortgages, other real estate loans and business loans. Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 illustrate 
average loan portfolio for all the credit unions and the different compositions of the loan 
portfolio in three typical size categories of credit unions respectively.  
 
Figure 2.2 Average loan portfolio for all the credit unions 
As a whole, from 2000 to 2018, used vehicle loans dominate the portfolio, taking up around 
30% of the portfolio. Before 2009, new vehicle loans took the second place while first 
mortgages took the place over after 2009, each making up nearly one-fifth of the portfolio 
in 2018. Other unsecured loans and unsecured credit cards remained stable during this 
period while other real estate loans raised to peak at 2008 and then shrank after the crisis. 
However, business loans kept increasing during the same period, from 0.47% to 2.30%, 
nearly five times its original number. Our observation is in line with Dopico (2016), who 
also noticed that there is a change in the loan portfolio and summarized that the weights 
have long been shifting to mortgages and business loans.  
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Figure 2.3 Different loan portfolios in different size of credit unions 
As seen from Figure 2.3, we notice that the loan composition differs significantly across 
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asset sizes. With credit union growing in size, its major loan type changes from used vehicle 
loans to first mortgages. For the smallest credit unions, used vehicle loans, other unsecured 
loans and new vehicle loans are dominating the loan portfolio while little amount was given 
to business loans. For medium-size credit unions, first mortgages are catching up with used 
vehicle loans, followed by new vehicle loans and other real estate loans. Still, business 
loans are barely attached with emphasis. For the largest credit unions, first mortgages are 
becoming the major loan type, far exceeding the second and third types, which are used 
and new vehicle loans. Although other real estate loans dropped sharply after the financial 
crisis, it still remains the fourth largest loan category. Interestingly, business loans are 
growing a lot, and this loan type is no more the one with little focus. We can draw a 
conclusion that real estate loans and business loans are becoming more important as credit 
unions grow in size, while vehicle loans stably maintain their critical roles in the loan 
portfolio. That is, secured loans are taking a larger portion of the loan portfolio as credit 
unions become larger. 
These differences may be attributed to some possible changes in regulatory constraints, 
changes in credit unions own ability to afford those large loans and changes of the 
management team, as types of the loan account, as well as prices and quantities of these 
accounts, are among the key decisions made by management team (Smith, 1984). Since 
merger activities have a direct influence on both asset size and management team, we argue 
merger activities would have a significant influence on loan portfolio composition.  
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3. Literature review 
3.1. Size and credit unions’ objectives 
Size has long been an important factor for credit unions to realize increasing returns to 
scale, improve credit unions' performance and enrich products. Murray and White (1980), 
using operating-cost-minimizing model and testing 152 credit unions from 1972-1975 in 
British Columbia, found evidence showing the credit unions realize increasing returns to 
scale as expanding asset. Wilcox (2005a) concluded that the larger the credit union is, the 
richer the financial products it provides. McKee and Kagan (2015) noticed that the average 
size of credit unions increased 600% from 1989-2006, and they gave their focus on small 
credit unions and researched on the determinants of their recent structural changes. Using 
annual data from 1994-2011, they examined the effects of macroeconomic and the firm's 
internal changes on small credit unions with less than 10 million in asset. They found that 
there may exist an efficiency gap between small asset credit unions and larger ones, while 
small credit unions also react more sensitively to changes in housing values and 
unemployment rate. Thus, they concluded, small credit unions are under pressure and 
incentive to grow in size in order to assure they are working profitably and guarantee their 
survivals as the deregulation made the distinction between financial institutions ambiguous. 
Dopico (2016) concluded the four most effective ways for credit unions to grow in size, 
using data from 1979 to 2016. Besides going through a merger, increasing deposit benefits, 
attaining a higher return on asset, providing richer key financial products and making 
higher market expense contributed most to asset growth. A similar conclusion was drawn 
long time ago by Smith (1984) when he continued Smith, Cargill and Meyer's (1980) 
previous study and tried to develop a theoretical model explaining credit union decision 
making. He, as well, argued that the rates charged on loans and paid on savings deposits, 
the types of accounts offered, and promotional and advertising activities all influence the 
level of total asset size of the credit union. He also argued that the key decisions made by 
management team are the types of loan and savings accounts to offer, and the prices and/or 
quantities of those accounts, which implies that management team plays an important role 
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in affecting the asset size, and thus influencing the credit union's objective. 
Unlike commercial banks whose goal is to maximize their profit, there is no agreement as 
to what the objective of credit unions should be. The most probable objectives of credit 
unions been argued so far are to maximize asset growth and/or membership growth, to 
offer more financial products, or to maximize the difference between market savings and 
loans rates compared with what credit unions provide (Fried et al., 1996; Goddard et al., 
2002; Smith 1984; Bauer 2008). At the same time, it is argued that the objective would be 
different across the sizes of credit unions. Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2008) 
investigated determinants of the financial performance of credit unions, using 5784 credit 
unions' semi-annual data from 1993-2004. They concluded that the strategies credit unions 
apply should differ across asset sizes. Larger credit unions should continue exploring new 
products according to their own expertise, while smaller ones should avoid over-
diversification and focus on basic saving and loan services. 
Given above, consolidation, as an activity which has direct effects on both size and 
management team of the credit union, should play an important role in affecting its 
objective, performance, credit supply as well as deposit and loan pricing behaviours. 
3.2. Impacts of credit union mergers 
In the sparse literature of credit union mergers, some argued that improvements are reached 
by target credit unions but not acquirers (Fried et al, 1999; Bauer, Miles and Nishikawa, 
2009; Dopico and Wilcox, 2010). Although credit unions' behavioural objective is the 
subject of some debate, Fried, Lovell and Yaisawarng (1999) reasonably assumed that 
credit unions aim at maximizing financial services while achieving a most cost-efficient 
way of managing the operating expense. They used the efficiency score as a performance 
indicator, studying nearly 6000 credit unions with 300 merger participants during 1988-
1995, and found that target credit unions have improved their service provision while 
acquirers have not. Bauer, Miles and Nishikawa (2009) argued that credit unions grow in 
size in order to realize the economies of scale, in line with Murray and White (1980), and 
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one alternative way for them to grow, other than internal growth, is through mergers. They 
studied U.S. merger activity data from 1994 to 2004, drawn from Call Report data of 
NCUA, examined efficiency changes and CAMEL ratio changes of both targets and 
acquirers. The uniqueness of their paper is that they examined whether regulators benefit 
from mergers, by studying CAMEL ratio, whose increase can be interpreted as gains to 
regulators. Improved CAMEL ratio means better financial stability; thus, regulators/public 
are benefitted from credit union mergers. The authors found improved CAMEL and 
efficiency gains to targets but little change in acquirers' efficiency, which means that there 
is a gain for members of target credit unions and for regulators but not for acquirers. Dopico 
and Wilcox (2010) argued that reducing noninterest expense is the primary objective of 
mergers. The authors studied credit union mergers in the U.S. from 1984 to 2009 to see 
how credit unions have achieved this objective. The authors found the largest impacts were 
achieved by mergers of equal-size credit unions while when the two credit unions were 
different in size, impacts were much larger for the targets.  
Conversely, some found that there were no gains for both acquirers and targets after 
mergers, compared to non-merging credit unions on average (Garden and Ralston, 1999; 
Ralston, Wright and Garden, 2001). Besides studies on the U.S. credit unions, there are 
some researches focusing on Australian ones. These studies also used efficiency score as 
an indicator of performance. Based on literature in mergers of banks, where a large number 
of studies argued that there is potential for banks to obtain efficiency gains through merger, 
Garden and Ralston (1999) proposed that credit unions may have also attempted to increase 
efficiency through mergers. They studied 16 Australian credit unions mergers from 1993 
to 1994 financial year and employed a DEA approach to examine merger effects on both 
allocative and x-efficiency. Different from the previous paper, this research added non-
merging credit unions as a control group and compared merged credit unions' efficiencies 
with the control group. They ended up finding no effects of either type of efficiency relative 
to other credit unions on average. Ralston, Wright and Garden (2000), as an extension of 
their previous study, again focused on Australian credit unions from 1993 to 1998 and 
merger sample data from 1994 to 1995, aiming to find out whether mergers will help small 
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financial institutions avoid extinction. However, the efficiency gains generated from 
mergers were again found to be no superior to those generated through internal growth. 
Worthington (2001), with focus on their efficiency changes after these mergers for 
Australian credit unions between 1993 to 1997, found that for the industry, on the whole, 
both pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency improved through mergers. Meanwhile, 
although Dopico and Wilcox (2010) found mergers were more beneficial to targets, they 
argued that over time and on average, however, mergers have been gradually shifted from 
only benefiting targets to the point where both targets and acquirers can obtain benefits. 
For example, they found that after recent mergers, instead of modestly increasing 
noninterest expense ratio as in the past, the ratios of acquiring credit unions dropped. 
As targets have been intensely argued to be the most beneficial party in a merger, many 
scholars tried to figure out the characteristics of targets in the credit union mergers. 
Worthington (2001) argued that smaller asset size is the key determinant of being a target 
in a merger activity while loan portfolio diversification has a significant influence on the 
probability of acquisition. Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2009), using semi-annual data 
from June 2001 to June 2006 of the U.S. merger wave, employed hazard functions and 
found that credit unions that have less room to grow or are constrained in growth 
opportunity are hardly attractive merger targets while credit unions with lower 
capitalization and narrower loan portfolios are vulnerable in mergers. These findings imply 
that members of the target credit union may potentially benefit from mergers as mergers 
help broaden the loan portfolio, thus members can enjoy richer services. 
3.3. Impacts of bank mergers 
Compared to the literature of credit union mergers, there are a lot more merger studies that 
investigate bank mergers. Carletti et al. (2001) and Prompitak (2009) summarized two 
major motivations of the merger in the banking industry: one is to increase market power 
and the other is to obtain efficiency gains. The first effect would drive up loan rates and 
lower down the deposit rates, thus raising up the interest margin, since banks will merge 
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with another one and exploit their market power to extract profits. This effect is also known 
as the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis. The second effect would do the 
opposite as the overall efficiency of the banking industry would be improved by 
consolidation and banks would try to pass efficiency gains to consumers. This effect is also 
known as the Efficient-Structure-Performance (ESP) hypothesis.   
Prompitak (2009) employed both simple OLS and difference-in-difference model to study 
merger effect on banks' loan pricing behaviour, using European banks data. He found 
support for the ESP hypothesis according to the lower loan rates and narrower interest 
margins after a merger. Conversely, Liebersohn (2017) used difference-in-difference model 
to research on how competition affects bank lending behaviours and found support for the 
argument that competition will enhance efficiency and loan quality, which is opposite to 
ESP and suggests that consolidation may do harm to the efficiency.  
Besides efficiency changes and interest rate changes, some studies attached their attention 
to credit supply changes after a merger. Studies before Berger et al. (1997) generally 
ignored the fact that merger activities can have an influence on operation focus since they 
are external dynamic events. Thus, Berger et al. (1997) were the first to decompose merger 
effects on small business lending into static and dynamic ones, where they gave focus on 
reactions of other local banks. Using data of over 6000 bank mergers, they concluded that, 
mergers generally reduce credit supply to small business, whereas part of the reduction was 
offset by other local financial institutions. Sapienza (2002) studied Italian bank data and 
examined the impacts of consolidation activities on the availability of credits for prior 
existing borrowers of the consolidated institutions, controlling the quality of the borrowers. 
The author concluded that the impacts of mergers depend on three factors: the reason to 
merge, whether it is an in-market merger or out-market one, and the market competition 
before the merger. He summarized three major findings. First, mergers involving banks 
that previously operated in the same area would benefit borrowers if these banks are with 
small market shares while things changed to the opposite if these banks are large ones. 
Second, the way mergers affect borrowers also depends on how much they relied on this 
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bank and how broad are other alternative financial sources. Finally, compared to banks who 
did not go through consolidation, small borrowers of the targets hardly can continue 
obtaining credits from the merged banks in the future. Haas et al. (2010) used 220 banks' 
data in 20 transition countries to study the loan portfolio composition determinants, which, 
they found, were bank ownership, size, and legislation of creditor protection. They also 
argued that large banks may have a relative advantage in lending to large customers as they 
can exploit scale economies in evaluating the hard information available on such customers. 
Thus, the consolidation process in transition countries may, therefore, lead to a reduced 
credit supply of large banks on SME financing. Similarly, Ogura and Uchida (2013), based 
on their empirical analysis of a Japanese small business financing dataset, found that, for 
small banks, soft information deteriorates after a merger, compared to those who didn't 
experience a merger. They concluded that bank mergers negatively affected credit supply 
for people who depended on small banks. 
Similar to credit union literature, characteristics of banks involved in mergers were 
investigated. Beccalli and Frantz (2013) found that target banks tend to be riskier than 
acquirers. Targets are generally cost and profit inefficient, less liquid, and less capitalized, 
while acquirers tend to be more diversified and better managed.  
3.4. Propensity score matching 
It has long been argued that bank mergers can potentially improve performance (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1992; Shaffer, 1993), though only a few studies confirmed this 
improvement (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Similarly, credit union area does not reach an 
agreement on merger effects, either. Given this disagreement on merger effects, Behr and 
Heid (2011) argued that this disagreement may partly be due to selection bias which 
happened when previous studies chose a wrong compare group. They used data of German 
bank mergers from 1995 to 2000 and employed propensity score matching strategy, 
avoiding selection bias, to study merger effects on bank performance. They matched every 
bank in a merger with a similar bank which did not experience a merger based on the 
propensity score, which, in their study, is the probability to merge. Instead of using standard 
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logit or probit model as previous research did, they used non-parametric Generalized 
Additive Model to calculate the probability to merge for every bank in the sample, 
irrespective of going through a merger or not, based on seven bank variables: return on 
asset, cost to income ratio, equity ratio, interest margin, non-performing loans ratio, liquid 
ratio and size. And then they matched banks in a merger with a non-merging bank that had 
the closest likelihood to merge as the merged one, and constructed a new sample consisting 
of only banks who went through a merger and their matching pairs. They studied the new 
sample and found neutral medium-term effects on profitability and cost efficiency in post-
merger years, which suggested that selection bias did affect the results of previous studies. 
We observed several gaps in the existing literature. Firstly, although enough attention has 
been attached to performance changes after a credit union consolidation, none of them have 
considered that selection bias might potentially affect the results. Secondly, unlike the 
banking field, where credit supply has drawn much emphasis, studies of credit union 
merger hardly investigated changes in credit supply. Existing literature offers little 
evidence of efficiency gains for acquiring credit unions. And merger effects on the loan 
portfolio and interest rates have rarely been studied. Thus, our study aims at filling up these 
gaps by examining merger effects on performance indicators, interest rate, credit supply 
and loan composition, from the perspective of acquiring credit unions. 
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4. Hypothesis development 
Credit unions generally have three major stakeholders: management team, 
members/owners and regulators/public. Credit unions, as a member-owned cooperative 
financial institution, are in business to best serve their members. Although recent studies 
did not find enough evidence that acquiring credit union obtain efficiency gains through a 
merger, we argue that, instead of an increase in efficiency score, benefits to members 
should be one of the most important goals for acquirers to conduct a merger. Members can 
be better off through better credit unions' performance, improved interest rates, more access 
to credit and richer loan services. Accordingly, we developed our hypotheses as follows. 
Return on asset and cost-to-income ratio are two primary indicators of performance, 
representing profitability and cost efficiency respectively. Members can get broader service 
and better interest rates as the credit union increase in profitability. Also, as argued by 
Dopico and Wilcox (2010), cost reduction is also one of the primary objectives of mergers. 
Reducing cost can also lead to higher profitability and thus benefit members. As such, we 
have our first hypothesis proposed as: 
H1: Mergers will benefit members by improving credit union’s performance, indicated by 
higher profitability and higher cost efficiency. 
Carletti et al. (2001) summarized two major merger hypotheses. One is the structure-
conduct-performance hypothesis, suggesting that financial institutions will cooperate with 
each other and exploit their market power to extract profits. The other one is an efficient-
structure-performance hypothesis, implying that the overall efficiency of the industry 
would be improved by mergers. They proposed that institutions would pass the gains to 
consumers by lowering loan interest rates and driving up deposit interest rates. As credit 
unions work for the benefits of members, we argue mergers of credit unions will follow 
efficient-structure-performance hypothesis. That is, credit unions would pass the gains to 
members by providing better interest rates. Thus, if mergers benefit the members, then 
interest rates offered by credit unions should be improved. Accordingly, we have our 
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second hypothesis, 
H2: Mergers will benefit members by improving deposit and loan interest rates, indicated 
by higher deposit interest rates and lower loan interest rates. 
The original intention of a credit union is to provide members in similar financial 
conditions and financial capacity with unsecured credits. Thus, consumer loans, among 
other services, should be the most important service in credit unions (McKee and Kagan, 
2015). Members would benefit from more access to credit supply. Thus, we propose that 
if mergers benefit members, we should observe more credit supply. Accordingly, we have 
our third hypothesis as, 
H3: Mergers will benefit members by increasing the credit union’s credit supply. 
Smith (1994) argues that: 
“The fundamental motivation of a credit union is to provide financial services to the 
membership, in particular a depository for savings and access to consumer and mortgage 
credit. Moreover, these offered services should be at least as attractive with respect to their 
price and non-price characteristics as those available from other institutions-otherwise 
there would be no economic rationale to organize the credit union or for members to 
participate. Therefore, the key decisions made by management are the types of loan and 
savings accounts to offer, and the prices and/or quantities of those accounts.”  (pp 1155) 
Thus, we have our fourth hypothesis, 
H4: Mergers will benefit members by expanding the choices of the loan portfolio. 
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5. Data and methodology 
5.1. Data 
The credit union data of our study are compiled from credit union financial information in 
‘5300 Call Reports', which are available on the National Credit Union Administration 
(NCUA) website. Each credit union collects and reports accounting information and 
operational data quarterly to NCUA, and the data is available from 1994 Q1 to 2018 Q4. 
To investigate merger effects on performance indicators, interest rate, credit supply and 
loan composition, we collected credit union financial data and macroeconomic data from 
2001 to 2016. M&A information, including merger date, surviving and target credit union 
names, identification numbers and locations, are made available from Credit Union 
National Association (CUNA). Call report data is available at a quarterly frequency from 
NCUA, we annualized accounting and operational data by using the year-end (December 
version) call reports.  
As credit union loan demand and deposit supply are dependent on state-level 
macroeconomic indicators, such as population, unemployment rate, per capita income and 
asset demand for money, we collected macroeconomic data from several sources. The 
annual county-level unemployment rate was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
for the year from 2000 to 2017. We aggregated the county-level data into state-level by 
summing up the total labour force data within one state and calculating the state-level 
unemployment rate using the sum numbers. We used the Housing Price Index to measure 
asset demand for money, following McKee and Kagan (2015), and the annual state-level 
value was available at the Federal Housing Finance Agency. We obtained the total number 
of business establishments from U.S. Census Bureau County Business Pattern Series, 
which was only accessible from 2000 to 2016, as an indicator of local economic condition. 
Per capita personal income and GDP growth rate were available from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, from 2000 to 2018 and from 2000 to 2017, respectively. Three-month 
Treasury bill interest rates were obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. For 
competition indicators, we calculated the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using the total 
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deposit of each credit union for each state. 
Gathering all the data mentioned above, we constructed our variables. Variables were either 
constructed from observed values and/or the first lag, or the observed outcome of a binary 
event (whether a credit union has gone through a merger and whether the merger is a cross-
state one). Variable symbols, definitions and sources of data are provided in Table 5.1.  
Panel A. Credit union variables 
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Panel B. State level and national level macro variables 
Table 5.1 Variable definition 
We classified our variables into credit union variables and regional macro variables. We 
used lagged value of the stock variable and used a log to scale down the large numbers of 
Housing Price Index value, number of establishments in each state and per capita personal 
income.   
As we would examine the effects of mergers, post-merger data and pre-merger data would 
be compared. To confirm that these differences between post- and pre-merger performance 
indicators are not affected by other recent mergers, we limited our sample by removing 
acquirers who had one or more other merge activities during the 2-year and 3-year window 
period surrounding a merger. That is, if the merger happened at time t, we constructed two 
samples, where we left year t-1 to year t+1 free from other mergers and clean year t-1 to 
year t+2 from other mergers, respectively. This filtering process limited our merger sample 
to 2606 mergers for the cleaned 2-year window and 2271 mergers for the cleaned 3-year 
window. The filter criterion is illustrated as follows. 
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Figure 5.1 Filter criterion explanation 
We then combined merger information with the credit union data and regional 
macroeconomic data using acquirers' credit union ID and year. We created a dummy 
variable called MERGER, which equals to 1 if the credit union experienced a merger at 
that year and otherwise equals to 0. Another dummy variable indicating whether the merger 
is cross-state was created, named CROSS. CROSS equals to 1 if the acquirer and the target 
are in different states, otherwise, it equals to 0. According to the Credit Union National 
Association (CUNA), the majority of the states allow to both in-state out-of-state credit 
unions branching. That is, credit unions can expand their services and enter into new 
markets by conducting a cross-state merger.   
We originally plan to study on mergers happening between 2001 and 2018. However, due 
to the limitation in data availability of U.S. Census Bureau County Business Pattern, which 
only updates till 2016, we only have variables available from 2001 to 2016. Additionally, 
since we would compare post-merger performance and pre-merger performance, which 
requires us to use lag and lead data, we can only study the post-1-year change of mergers 
conducted between 2002 and 2015 and post-2-year change of mergers happening between 
2002 and 2014. 
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5.2. Methodology 
In order to study whether the merger benefits members, we would compare several post-
merger indicators' changes between the acquirers and credit unions who did not go through 
a merger. The indicators' changes were calculated by subtracting the value of each indicator 
during the pre-merger period from that during the post-merger period. Post-merger periods 
we used were t+1 and t+2, with time t defined as the year when the merger transaction took 
place. Since the accounting data we used were all year-end data, we used t-1 as the pre-
merger period to ensure we did not miscalculate the effect. Thus, instead of comparing 
post-merger indicators at t+1 and t+2 with those at time t, we used variables at time t-1 as 
pre-merger indicators.   
Since the acquirers are generally larger and more profitable than average non-merging 
credit unions, instead of simply comparing them directly, we matched every acquirer with 
a similar credit union according to several criteria to avoid selection bias. We followed 
Behr and Heid (2011) in using Propensity Score Matching process to find a matching pair 
for each acquirer. First introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the propensity score 
matching method allows us to pair up treated credit unions with similar credit unions except 
the ‘treatment'. The treatment here means that the credit union has experienced a merger. 
This process mitigated the potential possibility of selection bias risen from the differences 
in the eight dimension we chose. We completed the PSM process as follows. 
‘Treatment' here refers to the merger activity, thus we divided our sample into two groups. 
One is the treated group, whose dummy variable MERGER equals to 1, and the other group 
is a control group, whose dummy variable MERGER equals to 0. Firstly, we estimated the 
probability of every credit union in our sample to be involved in a merger event using a 
propensity score model. This model is a logit regression model where the dummy variable 
MERGER is the dependent variable. The independent variables we used were similar to 
those used by Behr and Heid (2011) in the study on commercial banks. To make the 
variables more suitable for our credit union sample, we made some adjustments. Moreover, 
we added HHI as one additional criterion to represent the market concentration of each 
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state. Thus, together we have eight indicators to serve as independent variables in the 
propensity score model. We used return on asset (ROA) as a measure for a credit union's 
profitability and cost-to-income ratio (CI) to measure cost (in) efficiency. Net worth ratio 
(NWR) was used to control the credit union's financial strength, and net interest margin 
(NIM) was used to represent its ability to manage the spread. We used the non-performing 
loans ratio (NPL) and loan to deposit ratio (LDR) to control credit risk and liquidity risk 
of the credit union respectively. We used asset size to control for the size while HHI was 
used to control for concentration. Using these independent variables, we computed the 
propensity score, which estimates the likelihood of being involved in a merger given those 
indicators, for every credit union. Secondly, we matched every acquirer credit union to one 
non-merging counterpart with the closest propensity score within the merger transaction 
year. Thirdly, we put the matched pairs into one dataset.   
As such, we finished constructing our data set which includes the ‘treated' (actual acquirers) 
and ‘matched' control group. We used a dummy variable ‘MERGER' to distinguish them. 
With the closest propensity score, this process allowed us to assume that the matched group 
can represent the acquirers' characters as if the acquirers didn't go through a merger event. 
Then we can calculate indicator changes by subtracting pre-merger value from post-merger 
value for both merging credit unions and matched non-merging credit unions. 
To examine our hypothesis 1, we need to calculate changes in performance indicators:  
profitability indicator ROA and cost (in) efficiency indicator CI. We constructed our 
dependent variables droa_1 (droa_2) and dci_1 (dci_2) by subtracting the ROA and CI at 
time t-1 from their values at time t+1 (t+2). To test our hypothesis 2, dependent variables 
should be changes in average loan and deposit interest rates from the pre-merger period to 
post-merger period. Thus, dloan_rate_1 (dloan_rate_2) and ddepo_rate_1 (ddepo_rate_2) 
were constructed by subtracting loan interest rate and deposit interest rate at time t-1 from 
those at time t+1 (t+2), respectively. We also created dependent variable dtl_1 (dtl_2) as 
the difference between total loan ratio at time t-1 and that at time t+1 (t+2) to examine 
hypothesis 3. Finally, the difference between each loan proportion at time t-1 and t+1 (t+2) 
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was calculated to be the dependent variables of the regressions to test hypothesis 4. 
Therefore, we run a set of regressions and the model is presented as follows: 
𝑑𝑋_1(𝑑𝑋_2) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑟𝑜𝑎 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑛𝑖𝑚 +
𝛽7 ∗ 𝑛𝑤𝑟 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑛𝑝𝑙 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑙𝑑𝑟 +𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀    (5.1) 
Where: dX is the change in each indicator between pre-merger year t-1 and post-merger 
year t+1 (t+2)2; merger is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the credit union is an acquirer 
in year t and 0 otherwise; cross is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the merger involved two 
credit unions from different states and 0 otherwise; ROA, CI, SIZE, NIM, NWR, NPL, 
LDR and macro variables were all measured at time t-1; crisis controls are dummy variable 
crisis, which takes 1 if the merger happened during the financial crisis and equals to 0 
otherwise, and dummy variable postcrisis, which takes value 1 if the merger took place 
after the crisis and equals to 0 otherwise. 
We compared the changes in each indicator of merging credit unions with the changes of 
matched non-merging credit unions. Merger effect is defined as the difference of these 
changes between merging and non-merging credit unions. We calculated merger effect by 
subtracting the change in each indicator of the matched credit union from the change in 
each indicator of the real acquirers, using formula as follows: 
𝑑𝑑_𝑋_1 = 𝑑𝑋𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟_1 − 𝑑𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_1   (5.2) 
𝑑𝑑_𝑋_2 = 𝑑𝑋𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟_2 − 𝑑𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ_2   (5.3) 
Where X stands for all dependent variables mentioned above. 3  
 
2 As we create two samples, where one is cleaned from other recent mergers during t-1 to t+1 and the other is cleaned 
from other recent mergers during t-1 to t+2, dX_1 is calculated using the first sample while dX_2 is calculated from the 
second sample. 
3 Similarly, we calculate dd_X_1 using the first sample, which is cleaned from other mergers from t-1 to t+1, and we 
calculate dd_X_2 using the second sample, which is free from other mergers from t-1 to t+2. 
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6. Results 
6.1. Key statistics of the sample 
Table 6.1 presents key statistics of our sample after winsorization at 1% for both tails. For 
comparison, we separated the key statistics into three parts: one is for the acquirers 1 year 
prior to the merger, one is for acquirers 1 year after the merger and the remaining is for 
non-merging credit unions. Here, we compare acquirers with all the non-merging credit 
unions. 
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Table 6.1 Key statistics of the sample4 
 
4 Note: tl_a is total loans, ucc is unsecured credit card loans, oul is other unsecured loans, nvl is new vehicle loans, uvl 
is used vehicle loans, fm is first mortgages, orel is other real estate loans, bl is business loans, roa is return on asset; ci is 
cost-income ratio, nwr is net worth ratio, nim is net interest margin, npl is non-performing loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit 
ratio, size is natural logarithm of total asset, loan_rate is average loan rate, and depo_rate is average deposit rate. 
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We first simply compared the indicators of acquirers 1 year before the merger event with 1 
year after the merger. As seen in Table 2, there were many significant changes from pre-
merger time to post-merger periods. Average total loan to asset ratio decreased, meaning 
shrinking credit supply (seen from t-value of -11.20). There were numerically small but 
significant changes in the loan portfolios by simple comparison, where decrease in 
unsecured credit card loans (t-value of -5.81), decrease in new vehicle loans (with t-value 
of -8.47), increase in first mortgage (t-value of 5.08), decrease in other real estate loans 
(with t-value of -8.05) and increase in business loan (with t-value of 12.01) were observed. 
The profitability decreased (seen from t-value of -11.65) while cost-to-income ratio 
increased (with t-value of 22.32). The net worth ratio dropped (t-value of -2.23), net interest 
margin dropped (with t-value of -18.71). We also observed an increase in credit risk (with 
t-value of 2.51) but a decrease in liquidity risk (t-value of -2.22). Besides the larger size 
(with t-value of 38.19), we also observed decreasing loan interest rate (t-value of -25.37) 
and deposit interest rate (with t-value of -19.01). To conclude, by a simple comparison 
between statistics before and after the merger event, other than a decrease in the loan 
interest rate and increase in the offering of the first mortgage and business loan, we did not 
find any benefits to the members of the acquirers.   
We then compared the indicators of acquirers with those of all the credit unions who didn’t 
experience mergers. Acquirers were much larger in asset size, more profitable and more 
cost-efficient than their non-merging peers. In addition, the acquirers charged lower loan 
interest rates than the non-merging group. Furthermore, due to the size difference between 
the acquirers and non-merging counterparts, their loan portfolio differed a lot, where 
acquirers put more emphasis on first mortgages while credit unions which did not acquire 
focused more on vehicle loans. That is to say, when we studied the impacts of merger events, 
we cannot simply look at the differences between credit unions who conducted a merger 
and all those who did not. To address this problem, we employed PSM to find a matching 
pair for each acquirer. 
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6.2. Assessment of propensity score matching quality 
Table 6.2 reports the results of pairwise t-tests, which we used to assess the quality of the 
matching process. We matched each acquirer with a similar non-merging credit union based 
on eight indicators: return on asset, cost-to-income ratio, net-worth ratio, net interest 
margin, non-performing loan ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, size and HHI. We conducted the 
matching process at time t-1 instead of time t to avoid any influence on the financial reports 
due to the mergers. We calculated the treated mean, which is the mean of acquirer credit 
union indicators, and matched mean, which is the mean of matching group's indicators. A 
T-test was applied to test whether the differences of the means are different from zero.  
 
Table 6.2 Assess the matching quality: compare main variables at t-15 
 
5 Note: tl_a is total loans, ucc is unsecured credit card loans, oul is other unsecured loans, nvl is new vehicle loans, uvl 
is used vehicle loans, fm is first mortgages, orel is other real estate loans, bl is business loans, roa is return on asset; ci is 
cost-income ratio, nwr is net worth ratio, nim is net interest margin, npl is non-performing loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit 
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We report the results for both samples: one is cleaned from other mergers during t-1 to t+1 
and the other is free from the influence of other mergers during t-1 to t+2. Although there 
was one significant difference in the net worth ratio in the second sample, the numbers 
were very close, by comparing the number itself. We also compared other important 
variables between acquirers and matching peers. They have some differences in loan 
composition. However, these variables are not part of the matching criteria. In general, we 
can say that our matching procedure produced a good match, and it suggested that the 
acquirer credit unions and their matching pairs shared similar characteristics 1 year before 
the merger. That is, the matching group should have similar characters as the treated 
acquirers after the merger, except the influence brought by mergers.  
Table 6.3 reports pairwise correlation coefficients of the regression variables. Panel A 
provides pairwise correlation coefficients of credit union variables while Panel B reports 
the correlation coefficients of regional macroeconomic variables. 
 
Panel A. Credit union variables 
 
ratio, size is natural logarithm of total asset, loan_rate is average loan rate, hhi is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposits 
in each state, and depo_rate is average deposit rate. 
PSM criteria: return on asset, cost-income ratio, net worth ratio, net interest margin, non-performing loan ratio, loan-to-
deposit ratio, asset size and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposits. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B. Macro-variables 
Table 6.3 Correlation table of independent variables6 
As seen from Panel A, return on asset and cost-to-income were strongly correlated, 
however, it is very reasonable as the more efficient a credit union is, the more profitably it 
operates. Panel B shows the correlations of economic regional variables, where credit 
union HHI was highly correlated with the number of establishments in the state. We will 
not include them in the same model, to avoid potential multi-collinearity. Besides HHI and 
number of establishments, there were other pairs which seem to be highly correlated. 
However, due to the fact that we used those macro variables just to control for state effect 
and year effect, they will not affect our main results.  
 
6.3. Regression results 
Regression analysis is used to examine our hypotheses. To test our hypothesis 1, we run 
 
6 Note: Independent variables are all measured in one year prior to the merger (t-1). Merger is a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if credit union experienced a merger in that year and cross is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the merger 
is a cross-state one. Roa is return on asset; ci is cost-income ratio, nwr is net worth ratio, nim is net interest margin, npl 
is non-performing loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit ratio, size is natural logarithm of total asset,dgdp is GDP growth rate, 
hpi is housing price index, unem is unemployment rate, pcpi is per capita personal income, hhi is Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index of deposits in each state, rate is interest rate, crisis is a dummy variable which is 1 for 2008-2010, postcrisis is a 
dummy variable which is 1 after 2010, and est is number of establishments in the state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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regression on change of return on asset and on change of cost-to-income ratio. Results are 
shown in Table 6.4. As shown in this table, the coefficient of the merger dummy is 
negatively significant in regression of the change in return on asset 1 year after the merger 
(droa_1).  
 
Table 6.4 Regression analysis of changes in performance7 
 
7 The sample includes all the mergers and their matching pairs. droa_1 (dci_1)/droa_2 (dci_2) represents for the change 
in roa (ci) of a credit union between t-1 and t+1/t-1 and t+2. Independent variables are all measured in one year prior to 
the merger (t-1). Merger is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if credit union experienced a merger in that year and cross 
is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the merger is a cross-state one. Roa is return on asset; ci is cost-income ratio, nwr 
is net worth ratio, nim is net interest margin, npl is non-performing loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit ratio, size is natural 
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As 'merger' is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the credit union experienced a merger, 
the coefficient represents the difference in change of the profitability, compared to that of 
non-merging credit unions. The negative significant coefficient illustrates that a merged 
entity was on average less profitable one year following merger compared to their matched 
peers. However, two years after the merger the difference in profitability became 
insignificant. Although we did not find merger itself to have any influence on the change 
of cost efficiency (dci_1, dci_2), no matter one year or two years after the merger, cross-
state merger dummy (cross) is positive and significant at 5% two years following the 
merger. This result implies that when CUs were involved in mergers across the state line, 
we can see deterioration in cost efficiency. The cost of credit unions mainly came from the 
regulatory burden, non-regulatory compliance and cost of deposits. This deterioration in 
cost efficiency may be attributed to the difficulty in entering a new market, as such leading 
to higher cost of deposits, higher regulatory burden and/or non-regulatory compliance 
associated with such geographical expansion8.  
Previous studies on commercial bank mergers found evidence of improved operating 
performance for the merged banks (Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; DeLong and DeYoung, 
2007) using different proxies for operating performance, however, they did not include 
adjustments to control for selection bias. Behr and Heid (2011) also examined merger 
effects on commercial banks, and they compared the effects between ‘naive' comparison 
(compare the merged entities with the average non-merging group) and the comparison 
using propensity score matching sample. Contrast to previous studies, they found a 
 
logarithm of total asset,dgdp is GDP growth rate, hpi is housing price index, unem is unemployment rate, pcpi is per 
capita personal income, hhi is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposits in each state, rate is interest rate, crisis is a dummy 
variable which is 1 for 2008-2010, postcrisis is a dummy variable which is 1 after 2010, and est is number of 
establishments in the state. T-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
8  We further examined whether there was an impact on cost efficiency and profitability three and five years after the 
merger. These results are presented in Table A.5 in the Appendix. We did not observe any impacts on these performance 
ratios. However, when the merger was a cross-state one, we see deterioration in cost efficiency. 
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decrease in profitability in propensity score matching sample, but the decrease was less 
than that what they found in ‘naive' comparison. Also, they did not find any immediate 
effects on cost efficiency in the propensity score matching sample, but the ‘naive' 
comparison found a reduction in efficiency. Our results, which employed propensity score 
matching to compare acquirers with their matching peer and controlled pre-merger 
indicators and macroeconomic variables, were in line with what Behr and Heid (2011) have 
found using the propensity score matching but different from their ‘naive' comparison. 
The improvements on return on asset were positively related to pre-merger cost inefficiency. 
This may imply that an increase in profitability can be obtained more if the credit union 
has more room to improve cost efficiency. Profitability gains were also positively related 
to pre-merger size (size) and credit risk (NPL), while gains were negatively related with 
net interest margin (NIM) and net worth ratio (NWR). In contrary, improvements of cost 
efficiency were negatively related with profitability (ROA), net interest margin (NIM) and 
credit risk (NPL), but positively related with size and liquidity risk (LDR), although some 
effects did not show up in the first year.  
To examine our hypothesis 2, we applied regression analysis on average loan interest rates 
and average deposit rates (dloan_rate_1, dloan_rate_2, ddepo_rate_1 and ddepo_rate_2). 
We report the results in table 6.5. The insignificant coefficient of dummy variable 
MERGER indicates that compared to non-merging credit unions, merger on average had 
no impact on loan or deposit rates. The results supported neither SCP hypothesis nor ESP 
hypothesis proposed in banking mergers. However, we found negative and significant 
coefficients of cross-state merger indicator (cross) for change in deposit rates. When credit 
unions were involved in mergers across the state line, the members experienced a lower 
deposit rate compared to peer credit unions. This may reflect the fact that mergers cross the 
state line involved additional regulatory costs and CUs transferred the costs to the 
depositors. We related this result to our findings in Table 6.4, where we argued that the 
decrease in cost efficiency may be attributed to an increase in the cost of deposits and/or 
higher regulatory burden. Since we did not observe higher deposit interest rates, the 
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deterioration in cost efficiency should mainly come from additional regulatory burden 
brought by cross-state mergers9.  
 
Table 6.5 Regression analysis of changes in loan/deposit interest rates10 
 
9 As reported in Table A.6, we did not find any impact from the merger on change in loan interest rate up to five years 
after the merger, but we observed a deterioration in deposit rates five years after the merger. Additionally, for the cross-
state merger, we detected a deterioration in the deposit rate after three years and five years after the merger. Taken together, 
we saw deterioration in deposit rate persists for the cross-state merger from one year to five years after the merger. 
10  The sample includes all the mergers and their matching pairs. dloan_rate_1 (ddepo_rate_1)/dloan_rate_2 
(ddepo_rate_2) represents for the change in average loan (deposit) interest rate of a credit union between t-1 and t+1/t-1 
and t+2. Independent variables are all measured in one year prior to the merger (t-1). Merger is a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if credit union experienced a merger in that year and cross is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the merger 
is a cross-state one. Roa is return on asset; ci is cost-income ratio, nwr is net worth ratio, nim is net interest margin, npl 
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Furthermore, the results in Table 6.5 also showed that increase on loan interest rates was 
positively related with profitability (ROA), financial strength (NWR) and liquidity risk 
(LDR), but negatively related with cost efficiency (CI), size and net interest margin (NIM). 
Contrarily, the larger increase on deposit rates were obtained with higher profitability 
(ROA), lower cost-efficiency (CI), larger size, smaller net interest margin (NIM), higher 
financial strength (NWR), higher credit risk (NPL) and higher liquidity risk (LDR). 
As for our hypothesis 3, regression analysis was employed to study the change in total 
credit supply (dtl_1 and dtl_2). Results are presented in Table 6.6. The merger dummy 
(merger) is negatively significant, meaning that merger activity reduced the acquirers' 
credit supply more, in comparison to matched similar credit unions who didn't experience 
a merger. This effect was not transitory: we found that this effect persists up to two years 
after the merger11.  
 
is non-performing loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit ratio, size is natural logarithm of total asset,dgdp is GDP growth rate, 
hpi is housing price index, unem is unemployment rate, pcpi is per capita personal income, hhi is Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index of deposits in each state, rate is interest rate, crisis is a dummy variable which is 1 for 2008-2010, postcrisis is a 
dummy variable which is 1 after 2010, and est is number of establishments in the state. T-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
11 As reported in Table A.7, this impact seemed to not to persist after the second year. We did not detect a reduction in 
credit supply when compared with the non-merger peers either three or five years after the merger. Interestingly, three 
years after the merger, for cross-state acquirers we found an increase in their credit supply, which however did not persist 
five years after these mergers. 
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Table 6.6 Regression analysis of changes in credit supply12 
 
12 The sample includes all the mergers and their matching pairs. dtl_1/dtl_2 represents for the change in total loans 
(credit supply) of a credit union between t-1 and t+1/t-1 and t+2. Independent variables are all measured in one year prior 
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Our results were in line with commercial bank studies by Ogura and Uchida (2013) and by 
Sapienza (2002), who found that bank mergers negatively affected credit supply for small 
banks since soft information deteriorated after a merger, and this decrease was especially 
severe for small borrowers. 
Moreover, pre-merger characteristics also influence the change in credit supply. Decreases 
were achieved less with higher profitability (ROA), lower cost-efficiency (CI), larger size, 
narrower net interest margin (NIM) and better financial strength (NWR). Credit risk (NPL) 
and liquidity risk (LDR) were significant determinants of change in credit supply in the 
second year after the merger and they were negatively related to the increase of credit 
supply.   
Table 6.7 reports the results of our regression analysis on the change in the loan portfolio, 
to examine our hypothesis 4. For the better exposition, we classified the table into three 
panels. Panel A reports the results of unsecured loans (ducc and doul) while Panel B 
presents the results of vehicle loans (dnvl and duvl). Results of real estate loans (dfm and 
dorel) and business loans (dbl) are shown in Panel C. 
 
to the merger (t-1). Merger is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if credit union experienced a merger in that year and 
cross is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the merger is a cross-state one. Roa is return on asset; ci is cost-income ratio, 
nwr is net worth ratio, nim is net interest margin, npl is non-performing loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit ratio, size is 
natural logarithm of total asset,dgdp is GDP growth rate, hpi is housing price index, unem is unemployment rate, pcpi is 
per capita personal income, hhi is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposits in each state, rate is interest rate, crisis is a 
dummy variable which is 1 for 2008-2010, postcrisis is a dummy variable which is 1 after 2010, and est is number of 
establishments in the state. T-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel A. Regression analysis of changes in unsecured loans 
  
 
41 
 
Panel B. Regression analysis of change in vehicle loans. 
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Panel C. Regression analysis of change in real estate loans and business loans 
Table 6.7 Regression analysis of changes in loan portfolio13 
 
13 The sample includes all the mergers and their matching pairs. dX_1/dX_2 represents for the change loan portfolio of 
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As shown in Panel A, compared to non-merging credit unions, acquirers’ unsecured credit 
card loans (ducc_1) decreased more one year after the merger, but this effect seemed 
transitory. Additionally, compared with mergers that took place within the state, cross-state 
mergers faced less decrease in unsecured credit card loans in the first year after the merger 
(ducc_1) and more reduction in other unsecured loans for the first year and the second year 
after the merger (doul_1 and doul_2)14. This result was in line with the banking literature 
which argued mergers will negatively affect the credit supply of small banks due to 
deterioration in soft information. A cross-state merger definitely would lead to a decline in 
soft information and other unsecured loans rely heavily on that soft information. As such, 
we expected to observe a decrease in other unsecured loans more in a cross-state merger. 
Vehicle loan is an important loan category for credit unions, it is more so for smaller credit 
unions compared to larger ones. For vehicle loans (dnvl and duvl) shown in Panel B, we 
did not observe any impacts of mergers15. Results presented in Panel C indicated that the 
 
a credit union between t-1 and t+1/t-1 and t+2. Xs are each loan type. ucc is unsecured credit card loans, oul is other 
unsecured loans, nvl is new vehicle loans, uvl is used vehicle loans, fm is first mortgages, orel is other real estate loans, 
bl is business loans. Independent variables are all measured in one year prior to the merger (t-1). Merger is a dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if credit union experienced a merger in that year and cross is a dummy variable that equals to 1 
if the merger is a cross-state one. Roa is return on asset; ci is cost-income ratio, nwr is net worth ratio, nim is net interest 
margin, npl is non-performing loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit ratio, size is natural logarithm of total asset,dgdp is GDP 
growth rate, hpi is housing price index, unem is unemployment rate, pcpi is per capita personal income, hhi is Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of deposits in each state, rate is interest rate, crisis is a dummy variable which is 1 for 2008-2010, 
postcrisis is a dummy variable which is 1 after 2010, and est is number of establishments in the state. T-statistics in 
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
14 Further investigation beyond the second year (See Table A.8 Panel A) showed that there was no significant difference 
in either of these loan categories, i.e. all the impact on these loan categories seemed transitory. 
15 When we extended our analysis to three years and five years after the merger, we found that (see Table A.8 Panel B), 
the acquiring credit unions decreased their credit supply to new vehicle loans compared to their peers three years after 
the merger. However, those results seemed transitory.  
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acquirers increased the proportion of first mortgages (dfm_1) less and decreased the 
proportion of other real estate loans (dorel_1) more in the portfolio for the first year after 
the merger, compared to non-merging credit unions. These impacts did not last longer than 
one year, though16. Moreover, contrast to previous studies on banks that found mergers 
generally decreased credit supply to small business loans (Berger et al., 1997; Haas et al., 
2010), our results indicated that credit union merger events had no effects on business loans 
(dbl). And we did not find any difference between in-state mergers and out of state mergers 
in determining the change in neither real estate loans nor business loans17.  
To conclude, acquirers decreased proportions of both unsecured and collateralized loans 
more or increased these loans less. However, in all cases the changes in loan portfolios 
were transitory. 
As the regression analysis shows, profitability decreases were more severe in merger 
activities in the first year, while they did not influence cost efficiency, as well as the average 
loan and deposit rates. Cross-state mergers also led to deterioration in cost efficiency and 
deposit interest rates. We also found that credit unions experiencing a merger would shrink 
their credit supply more and the impacts lasted at least for two years following the merger, 
although the magnitude got smaller in the second year. For loan portfolio, acquirers 
decreased their loan proportions for both unsecured loans and collateralized real estate 
loans more and increased first mortgage less, but the impacts did not last longer than one 
year. However, vehicle loans, which make up significant parts of loan portfolio across all 
sizes, were not influenced by the merger activities. Cross-state mergers, compared to those 
within the state, led to less decrease in unsecured credit card loans but higher reduction in 
 
16 When we extended our analysis beyond the second year, we did not find any difference from our original analysis for 
the first two years except for cross-state mergers, which increased credit supply to other real estate loans beyond 3 years 
after the merger (see Table A.8 Panel C).  
17 When we extended our analysis longer than the second year, we found acquirers increased business loans compared 
to peer credit unions those who did not experience any merger (see Table A.8 Panel C).  
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other unsecured loans. 
6.4. Merger effects 
We also conducted t-tests for merger effect. We first calculated the change in every 
dependent variable in the regressions, for every acquirer and their matched peer. Then 
changes of the matching group were subtracted from the changes of acquirers, and we 
defined this difference-in-difference as merger effects. T-tests were applied to these merger 
effects. Results are shown in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8 Merger effect18 
As we can see from Table 6.8, compared to non-merging similar peers, acquirers 
 
18 Merger effect: the differences in changes of performance/credit supply/loan portfolio/average loan and deposit interest 
rate of the merged and the matching groups. We calculate the merger effect by subtracting matching groups’ numbers 
from merger groups’ numbers. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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experienced less improvement in profitability and cost-efficiency for the first year after the 
merger. And there appeared no difference in the subsequent year. However, acquirers had 
a decrease in credit supply and this effect lasted for at least two years after the merger. Also, 
the first year after the merger, unsecured credit card loans and real estate loans all reduced 
at a higher rate in proportion in the loan portfolios, compared to non-merging credit unions. 
These effects were transitory, though. Meanwhile, acquirers' deposit interest rates 
deteriorated compared to non-merging counterparts. The results shown in Table 6.8 were 
in line with our regression analysis19. 
We also separated our sample into three periods: before the crisis, during the crisis and 
after the crisis. The results of merger effects during these three periods are reported in the 
Table A.1 to Table A.3.  
 
  
 
19 We also examine merger effects for three years after the merger and five years after the merger and report the results 
in Table A.9. Acquirers are shown to experience more increase in business loans but more decrease in deposit interest 
rates.  
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7. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our study examined the impacts of merger activities in the U.S. on acquirer credit unions, 
to investigate whether members can get benefit from a merger event. The uniqueness of 
our study is that we are the first to investigate merger effects on benefits of members of the 
credit union. We examined the merger impacts on four aspects: performance indicators, 
average interest rates, credit supply and loan portfolio composition. A member can benefit 
if merger results in better performance (higher profitability or higher cost efficiency), 
extended credit supply, better interest rates on deposit or loan and richer array of financial 
products.  
As acquirers are different from non-merging credit unions in size, profitability and cost 
efficiency, we argued that there may be possible selection bias if we simply compare the 
acquirer credit unions with all those who did not experience a merger. To mitigate this 
potential bias, we follow Behr and Heid (2011), applying propensity score matching, to 
match every acquirer with a similar non-merging peer based on credit union characteristic 
indicators and use the acquirer and its matching peer to form our data sample. Our sample 
includes mergers that took place between 2002 and 2015. 
Compared with matched non-merging peers, acquirer credit unions went through a higher 
rate in profitability reduction in the first year after the merger, while cost efficiency showed 
no superior improvements. Acquirers did not perform better than their non-merging 
counterparts after a merger in profitability and cost efficiency. Cross-state mergers led to 
deterioration in cost efficiency. Also, we did not find any superior improvement on average 
interest rates, no matter for loan interest rates nor deposit interest rates. That is, members 
did not get any superior benefits on interests, in comparison to what they could receive if 
there was no merger. Cross-state mergers even led to worse deposit interest rates, as 
compared to mergers within the state. However, we found that acquirers reduced overall 
credit supply more as compared to the non-merging control group. This indicates that 
members even got worse off for at least up to two years after the merger: acquirer credit 
unions provided fewer loans than what they would do without a merger. We did not observe 
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any longer-than-one-year change in the loan portfolio composition following the merger. 
However, one year following merger we observed that members of acquirers received less 
availability to unsecured credit card loans and real estate loans. That is, members, 
compared to those of non-merging ones, had less access to diversified loan services. Cross-
state mergers faced less decrease in unsecured credit card loans but more decrease in other 
unsecured loans. To conclude, we found that members did not obtain any advantages in the 
short term, compared to what they may expect without a merger. Part of this deterioration 
was relieved in the second year after the merger, though. 
Then we are considering why credit unions still chose to conduct a merger if there were no 
benefits for their members. As mentioned by Bauer et al. (2009), there are three 
stakeholders of credit unions: members, management team and the regulators. Although 
members are shown to not benefit from the merger, we suspect the other two may be the 
gainers. Thus, we propose several possible reasons for conducting a merger. 
Firstly, noticed by Bauer, Miles and Nishikawa (2009) that National Credit Union Share 
Insurance Fund is a co-insurance fund, where every member of this fund is jointly 
responsible for covering up any shortage without limit and a shortage may develop by 
failing credit unions. Such shortage has been developed in 2008 and it was reported that 
the average credit union had to bear a 62 basis points decline in the ROA (NCUA Letter to 
Credit Unions, 2009). Thus, acquirers may conduct a merger to save a failing credit union 
since it may be cheaper to merge and absorb the failing credit union than to let them fail. 
Secondly, many mergers may be forced and assisted with the help of the regulators to 
stabilize the whole industry. The improved CAMEL ratios are the benefits of regulators, 
confirmed in the study by Bauer, Miles and Nishikawa (2009). Thirdly, according to CUES 
Executive Compensation Survey Executive Summary 20 , we observe an increase in 
compensation as the asset size of a credit union becomes larger. The report also summarized 
 
20  CUES executive compensation survey collects information about credit union executive compensation and the 
summary is a report that summarizes the data from the survey. 
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top performance measures to determine the CEO's bonus, among which, earnings, board 
evaluation, loan growth and membership growth drew our attention. Since merger activities 
will drive up the asset size and membership, which may bring potential benefit to managers 
via compensation; this is a conjecture based on year survey, though.  
We have some limitations in our study. Firstly, we do not have access to managerial 
compensation data; thus, we cannot examine the merger impacts on the management team. 
Secondly, we only examine the impacts brought by one single merger event, but we do not 
research the impacts brought by multiple mergers. Moreover, we only emphasize on post-
one-year and post-two-year impacts of mergers but do not investigate long-term impacts 
of such mergers. Also, we notice that in our sample, there are some acquiring credit unions 
whose return on asset ratio is less than zero and who are less than well-capitalized (net 
worth ratio less than 7% but greater than 6%), but we do not conduct studies on them 
separately. Thus, future studies can focus on the effect of the merger on managerial 
compensation if richer data on compensation is available and emphasize on examining the 
long-term benefits to members. Furthermore, separate studies can be conducted on those 
acquiring credit unions who are not profitable and/or less than well-capitalized. Impacts 
brought by multiple merger events should also be one focus in future studies.  
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Appendix  
Table A.1. Merger effect before crisis: the differences in changes of performance/credit 
supply/loan portfolio/average loan and deposit interest rate of the merged and the matching 
groups 
We calculate the merger effect by subtracting matching groups’ numbers from merger 
groups’ numbers.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Merger Effect (before crisis) 
  roa 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 -0.0005 -1.62 0.1047 
2yr 817 0.000431 1.13 0.2584 
  ci 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 0.000782*** 2.87 0.0042 
2yr 817 0.00298 0.76 0.4492 
  tl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 -0.00943** -2.17 0.0301 
2yr 817 -0.00596 -1.08 0.2796 
  ucc 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 -0.00016 -0.19 0.8507 
2yr 817 -0.00145 -1.5 0.1349 
  oul 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 -0.00277 -1.36 0.173 
2yr 817 0.000476 0.24 0.8094 
  nvl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 0.00385 1.46 0.1437 
2yr 817 -0.00092 -0.26 0.7975 
  uvl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 -0.00081 -0.25 0.802 
2yr 817 0.00182 0.46 0.6445 
  fm 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 -0.00311 -0.94 0.3462 
2yr 817 0.00316 0.74 0.4611 
  orel 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 -0.00520*** -2.23 0.0261 
2yr 817 -0.00507 -1.62 0.1061 
  bl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 -0.00012 -0.11 0.9153 
2yr 817 0.00102 0.72 0.4725 
  loan_rate 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 -0.00007 -0.21 0.8328 
2yr 817 0.000283 0.68 0.4968 
  depo_rate 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 982 -0.00051** -2.25 0.025 
2yr 817 -0.00048* -1.65 0.0997 
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Table A.2. Merger effect during crisis: the differences in changes of performance/credit 
supply/loan portfolio/average loan and deposit interest rate of the merged and the matching 
groups 
We calculate the merger effect by subtracting matching groups’ numbers from merger 
groups’ numbers.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Merger Effect (during crisis) 
  roa 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 -0.00087 -1.53 0.1271 
2yr 352 0.000057 0.09 0.9264 
  ci 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 0.0105* 1.84 0.067 
2yr 352 0.00253 0.39 0.7004 
  tl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 -0.00324 -0.54 0.5867 
2yr 352 0.00178 0.24 0.8139 
  ucc 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 -0.00195** -2.14 0.0332 
2yr 352 0.000313 0.22 0.8281 
  oul 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 0.0018 0.86 0.391 
2yr 352 0.00361 1.39 0.1647 
  nvl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 0.00254 0.72 0.4719 
2yr 352 0.00536 1.07 0.2863 
  uvl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 0.00222 0.51 0.6117 
2yr 352 0.00581 0.99 0.3207 
  fm 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 -0.0116** -2.21 0.0274 
2yr 352 -0.0213*** -3.27 0.0012 
  orel 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 0.000643 0.18 0.8541 
2yr 352 0.00473 1.16 0.2477 
  bl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 0.00233 1.27 0.2061 
2yr 352 -0.00034 -0.14 0.8922 
  loan_rate 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 -0.00021 -0.47 0.6421 
2yr 352 0.00026 0.5 0.6181 
  depo_rate 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 432 -0.00049 -1.3 0.1945 
2yr 352 0.000095 0.19 0.8516 
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Table A.3. Merger effect after crisis: the differences in changes of performance/credit 
supply/loan portfolio/average loan and deposit interest rate of the merged and the matching 
groups 
We calculate the merger effect by subtracting matching groups’ numbers from merger 
groups’ numbers.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Merger Effect (after crisis) 
  roa 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 0.000035 0.12 0.9019 
2yr 456 -0.00028 -0.72 0.469 
  ci 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 -0.00436 -1.13 0.2603 
2yr 456 -0.00368 -0.68 0.4992 
  tl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 -0.0130*** -2.87 0.0042 
2yr 456 -0.0147** -2.27 0.0238 
  ucc 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 -0.00127* -1.85 0.0643 
2yr 456 -0.00046 -0.44 0.6612 
  oul 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 0.00152 1.04 0.2966 
2yr 456 0.000117 0.04 0.9675 
  nvl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 -0.0044 -1.63 0.1033 
2yr 456 -0.00610 -1.52 0.1296 
  uvl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 -0.00504 -1.33 0.1828 
2yr 456 -0.00666 -1.17 0.2422 
  fm 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 -0.00406 -1.07 0.2862 
2yr 456 -0.00321 -0.53 0.5937 
  orel 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 -0.00539** -2.4 0.0167 
2yr 456 -0.00253 -0.67 0.5035 
  bl 
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# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 0.000043 0.03 0.9766 
2yr 456 0.00112 0.47 0.6414 
  loan_rate 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 0.000115 0.39 0.696 
2yr 456 0.000044 0.11 0.9136 
  depo_rate 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
1yr 704 -0.00024** -2.43 0.0155 
2yr 456 -0.00013 -0.89 0.3713 
 
  
60 
 
Table A.4. Assess the matching quality (for studying post-3-yr change and post-5-yr 
change): compare main variables at t-1 
tl_a is total loans, ucc is unsecured credit card loans, oul is other unsecured loans, nvl is new vehicle 
loans, uvl is used vehicle loans, fm is first mortgages, orel is other real estate loans, bl is business loans, 
roa is return on asset; ci is cost-income ratio, nwr is net worth ratio, nim is net interest margin, npl is 
non-performing loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit ratio, size is natural logarithm of total asset, loan_rate 
is average loan rate, hhi is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposits in each state, and depo_rate is 
average deposit rate. 
 
PSM criteria: return on asset, cost-income ratio, net worth ratio, net interest margin, non-performing 
loan ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, asset size and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposits. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
acquirer 
clean from pre 1yr to post 3yr clean from pre 1yr to post 5 yr 
N 
Treated 
Mean 
Matched 
mean 
T stat of 
difference 
N 
Treated 
Mean 
Matched 
mean 
T stat of 
difference 
roa 2085 0.00607 0.00613 0.25 1816 0.00592 0.00613 0.91 
ci 2085 0.6594 0.6594 0 1816 0.6667 0.6671 0.07 
nwr 2085 0.1186 0.1165 -1.82* 1816 0.1192 0.1182 -0.86 
nim 2085 0.0383 0.0386 1.26 1816 0.038 0.0385 1.32 
npl 2085 0.0137 0.0134 -0.8 1816 0.0138 0.0135 -0.66 
ldr 2085 0.7184 0.7182 -0.03 1816 0.7122 0.7195 1.22 
size 2085 18.1693 18.168 0.03 1816 18.0881 18.069 -0.39 
hhi 2085 419.2 427.1 0.71 1816 417.5 409.9 -0.67 
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Table A.5. Regression analysis of changes in performance (post-3-year and post-5-yr 
change) 
The sample includes all the mergers and their matching pairs. droa_3 (dci_3)/droa_5 (dci_5) represents for 
the change in roa (ci) of a credit union between t-1 and t+3/t-1 and t+5. Independent variables are all measured 
in one year prior to the merger (t-1). Merger is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if credit union experienced 
a merger in that year and cross is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the merger is a cross-state one. Roa is 
return on asset; ci is cost-income ratio, nwr is net worth ratio, nim is net interest margin, npl is non-performing 
loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit ratio, size is natural logarithm of total asset,dgdp is GDP growth rate, hpi is 
housing price index, unem is unemployment rate, pcpi is per capita personal income, hhi is Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of deposits in each state, rate is interest rate, crisis is a dummy variable which is 1 for 2008-
2010, postcrisis is a dummy variable which is 1 after 2010, and est is number of establishments in the state. 
T-statistics in brackets.  
VARIABLES droa_3 droa_3 droa_5 droa_5 dci_3 dci_3 dci_5 dci_5 
  
        
merger -0.00034 -0.00034 -0.00017 -0.00017 0.00001 0.00002 0.00048 0.00033 
 [-1.15] [-1.15] [-0.48] [-0.48] [0.00] [0.01] [0.10] [0.07] 
cross -0.00040 -0.00040 0.00021 0.00013 0.02554** 0.02552** 0.03367** 0.03473** 
 [-0.42] [-0.43] [0.18] [0.12] [2.24] [2.23] [2.06] [2.13] 
ci 0.01265*** 0.01258*** 0.01742*** 0.01734*** 
    
 [9.08] [9.03] [10.44] [10.42] 
    
size 0.00020 0.00019 0.00020 0.00021 -0.00593*** -0.00590*** -0.01748*** -0.01769*** 
 [1.45] [1.42] [1.23] [1.27] [-3.67] [-3.65] [-7.66] [-7.75] 
nim -0.16312*** -0.16407*** -0.23312*** -0.22970*** -0.48697* -0.47403* -3.67328*** -3.74807*** 
 [-7.99] [-8.01] [-9.40] [-9.24] [-1.91] [-1.85] [-10.36] [-10.55] 
nwr -0.02824*** -0.02820*** -0.02978*** -0.02962*** 0.07497 0.07478 0.09117 0.08688 
 [-6.67] [-6.66] [-6.13] [-6.10] [1.44] [1.44] [1.31] [1.25] 
npl 0.07155*** 0.07177*** 0.10820*** 0.10780*** 1.16484*** 1.16160*** 1.22376*** 1.23448*** 
 [5.95] [5.97] [7.14] [7.12] [7.87] [7.85] [5.63] [5.69] 
ldr 0.00231** 0.00233** 0.00573*** 0.00561*** -0.05487*** -0.05516*** -0.00551 -0.00331 
 [2.25] [2.26] [4.71] [4.61] [-4.44] [-4.45] [-0.32] [-0.19] 
dgdp -0.00020*** -0.00020*** -0.00034*** -0.00034*** -0.00201*** -0.00198*** 0.00211** 0.00215** 
 [-3.33] [-3.38] [-4.76] [-4.80] [-2.79] [-2.74] [2.12] [2.16] 
hpi -0.00504*** -0.00527*** 0.00005 0.00011 0.06251*** 0.06426*** 0.10781*** 0.10555*** 
 [-4.15] [-4.37] [0.04] [0.07] [4.26] [4.41] [5.16] [5.08] 
unem 0.00005 0.00004 0.00021 0.00029* 0.00479*** 0.00493*** -0.00064 -0.00191 
 [0.38] [0.29] [1.35] [1.79] [3.24] [3.19] [-0.29] [-0.84] 
pcpi -0.00064 -0.00063 -0.00246 -0.00182 0.01495 0.01545 0.02665 0.01607 
 [-0.47] [-0.45] [-1.46] [-1.07] [0.90] [0.91] [1.12] [0.67] 
hhi -0.00806* 
 
0.00189 
 
0.06442 
 
-0.09197 
 
 [-1.89] 
 
[0.34] 
 
[1.25] 
 
[-1.18] 
 
rate -0.00039*** -0.00039*** 0.00094*** 0.00098*** 0.02765*** 0.02767*** 0.01227*** 0.01158*** 
 [-2.98] [-2.94] [6.28] [6.52] [17.39] [17.23] [5.79] [5.43] 
crisis 0.00359*** 0.00362*** 0.00268*** 0.00252*** 0.11363*** 0.11333*** 0.08128*** 0.08415*** 
 [8.05] [8.04] [5.10] [4.75] [20.94] [20.71] [10.90] [11.15] 
postcrisis 0.00081 0.00085 0.00480*** 0.00450*** 0.07182*** 0.07131*** 0.02813** 0.03332*** 
 [1.30] [1.34] [5.36] [4.96] [9.70] [9.42] [2.22] [2.60] 
est 
 
0.00023 
 
-0.00038* 
 
-0.00214 
 
0.00797*** 
 
 
[1.25] 
 
[-1.72] 
 
[-0.95] 
 
[2.59] 
roa 
    
3.59364*** 3.58734*** 3.49382*** 3.53838*** 
 
    
[11.75] [11.71] [8.20] [8.31] 
Constant 0.02554** 0.02348* 0.01260 0.00969 -0.39091*** -0.37761*** -0.32497 -0.29080 
 [2.10] [1.94] [0.85] [0.66] [-2.66] [-2.58] [-1.55] [-1.40] 
 
        
Observations 2,882 2,882 1,906 1,906 2,882 2,882 1,906 1,906 
R-squared 0.170 0.169 0.202 0.203 0.319 0.319 0.259 0.261 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.165 0.164 0.195 0.196 0.315 0.315 0.253 0.255 
Ftest 36.58 36.42 29.86 30.09 83.96 83.90 41.28 41.73 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.6. Regression analysis of changes in loan/deposit interest rates (post-3-year and 
post-5-yr change) 
The sample includes all the mergers and their matching pairs. dloan_rate_3 (ddepo_rate_3)/dloan_rate_5 
(ddepo_rate_5) represents for the change in average loan (deposit) interest rate of a credit union between t-1 
and t+3/t-1 and t+5. Independent variables are all measured in one year prior to the merger (t-1). Merger is a 
dummy variable that equals to 1 if credit union experienced a merger in that year and cross is a dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if the merger is a cross-state one. Roa is return on asset; ci is cost-income ratio, nwr 
is net worth ratio, nim is net interest margin, npl is non-performing loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit ratio, size 
is natural logarithm of total asset,dgdp is GDP growth rate, hpi is housing price index, unem is unemployment 
rate, pcpi is per capita personal income, hhi is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposits in each state, rate is 
interest rate, crisis is a dummy variable which is 1 for 2008-2010, postcrisis is a dummy variable which is 1 
after 2010, and est is number of establishments in the state. T-statistics in brackets.  
VARIABLES dloan_rate_3 dloan_rate_3 dloan_rate_5 dloan_rate_5 ddepo_rate_3 ddepo_rate_3 ddepo_rate_5 ddepo_rate_5 
  
        
merger -0.00047 -0.00047 0.00003 0.00004 -0.00028 -0.00028 -0.00069** -0.00071** 
 [-1.40] [-1.40] [0.08] [0.09] [-1.10] [-1.12] [-2.34] [-2.40] 
cross -0.00101 -0.00100 0.00001 0.00005 -0.00231*** -0.00228*** -0.00312*** -0.00305*** 
 [-0.95] [-0.93] [0.01] [0.04] [-2.88] [-2.84] [-3.22] [-3.15] 
roa 0.09707*** 0.09785*** 0.10143** 0.10343** 0.30019*** 0.30188*** 0.18289*** 0.18826*** 
 [2.82] [2.84] [2.34] [2.38] [11.64] [11.70] [5.90] [6.07] 
ci 0.01862*** 0.01868*** 0.01657*** 0.01668*** 0.02562*** 0.02571*** 0.01960*** 0.01981*** 
 [9.84] [9.88] [6.90] [6.94] [18.07] [18.14] [11.40] [11.55] 
size -0.00056*** -0.00056*** -0.00114*** -0.00114*** 0.00031*** 0.00030*** 0.00055*** 0.00054*** 
 [-3.61] [-3.61] [-5.96] [-5.97] [2.66] [2.62] [4.04] [3.96] 
nim -0.39721*** -0.39762*** -0.36962*** -0.37155*** -0.17594*** -0.17755*** 0.05223** 0.04558* 
 [-15.65] [-15.60] [-11.36] [-11.36] [-9.24] [-9.29] [2.24] [1.95] 
nwr 0.02797*** 0.02792*** 0.02490*** 0.02479*** 0.00881** 0.00871** -0.00096 -0.00128 
 [5.75] [5.73] [4.30] [4.27] [2.41] [2.39] [-0.23] [-0.31] 
npl 0.01957 0.01962 0.01504 0.01547 0.02739** 0.02767*** -0.01506 -0.01390 
 [1.37] [1.37] [0.81] [0.83] [2.55] [2.58] [-1.13] [-1.05] 
ldr 0.00587*** 0.00590*** 0.00272* 0.00277* 0.00619*** 0.00628*** -0.00320*** -0.00304*** 
 [5.04] [5.05] [1.90] [1.93] [7.09] [7.17] [-3.13] [-2.96] 
dgdp 0.00061*** 0.00061*** 0.00034*** 0.00034*** 0.00048*** 0.00048*** -0.00016*** -0.00016*** 
 [9.06] [9.06] [4.05] [4.06] [9.56] [9.53] [-2.71] [-2.69] 
hpi 0.00582*** 0.00595*** 0.00524*** 0.00525*** -0.00082 -0.00068 -0.00846*** -0.00865*** 
 [4.24] [4.36] [3.02] [3.04] [-0.79] [-0.66] [-6.81] [-7.01] 
unem 0.00075*** 0.00074*** 0.00060*** 0.00056*** 0.00020** 0.00017 -0.00056*** -0.00065*** 
 [5.40] [5.09] [3.21] [2.94] [1.97] [1.56] [-4.21] [-4.77] 
pcpi -0.00084 -0.00100 -0.00603*** -0.00630*** 0.00150 0.00113 -0.00204 -0.00278* 
 [-0.54] [-0.63] [-3.05] [-3.14] [1.29] [0.95] [-1.45] [-1.94] 
hhi 0.00399 
 
0.00060 
 
0.00360 
 
-0.00766* 
 
 [0.83] 
 
[0.09] 
 
[0.99] 
 
[-1.65] 
 
rate -0.00065*** -0.00066*** -0.00076*** -0.00077*** -0.00301*** -0.00303*** -0.00194*** -0.00199*** 
 [-4.36] [-4.39] [-4.29] [-4.36] [-26.84] [-26.78] [-15.42] [-15.70] 
crisis -0.00615*** -0.00614*** -0.00744*** -0.00737*** -0.01353*** -0.01349*** -0.01034*** -0.01013*** 
 [-12.12] [-11.99] [-12.02] [-11.76] [-35.54] [-35.12] [-23.35] [-22.63] 
postcrisis -0.01037*** -0.01033*** -0.01180*** -0.01167*** -0.01342*** -0.01330*** -0.00466*** -0.00431*** 
 [-14.56] [-14.20] [-11.21] [-10.94] [-25.13] [-24.39] [-6.19] [-5.65] 
est 
 
-0.00005 
 
0.00012 
 
0.00006 
 
0.00059*** 
 
 
[-0.22] 
 
[0.49] 
 
[0.38] 
 
[3.20] 
Constant -0.02299* -0.02115 0.04629*** 0.04787*** -0.03043*** -0.02753*** 0.04415*** 0.04613*** 
 [-1.67] [-1.54] [2.66] [2.77] [-2.95] [-2.68] [3.54] [3.74] 
 
        
Observations 2,882 2,882 1,906 1,906 2,882 2,882 1,906 1,906 
R-squared 0.222 0.222 0.249 0.249 0.552 0.552 0.517 0.519 
Adjusted R-squared 0.218 0.218 0.242 0.242 0.550 0.550 0.513 0.515 
Ftest 48.16 48.12 36.76 36.78 207.9 207.8 118.9 119.9 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.7. Regression analysis of changes in credit supply (post-3-year and post-5-yr 
change) 
The sample includes all the mergers and their matching pairs. dtl_3/dtl_5 represents for the change in total 
loans (credit supply) of a credit union between t-1 and t+3/t-1 and t+5. Independent variables are all measured 
in one year prior to the merger (t-1). Merger is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if credit union experienced 
a merger in that year and cross is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the merger is a cross-state one. Roa is 
return on asset; ci is cost-income ratio, nwr is net worth ratio, nim is net interest margin, npl is non-performing 
loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit ratio, size is natural logarithm of total asset,dgdp is GDP growth rate, hpi is 
housing price index, unem is unemployment rate, pcpi is per capita personal income, hhi is Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of deposits in each state, rate is interest rate, crisis is a dummy variable which is 1 for 2008-
2010, postcrisis is a dummy variable which is 1 after 2010, and est is number of establishments in the state. 
T-statistics in brackets.  
VARIABLES dtl_3 dtl_3 dtl_5 dtl_5 
  
    
merger -0.00563 -0.00558 -0.00906 -0.00912 
 [-1.32] [-1.31] [-1.54] [-1.55] 
cross 0.02768** 0.02746** -0.00581 -0.00546 
 [2.02] [2.00] [-0.30] [-0.28] 
roa 0.88627** 0.87279** -1.91727*** -1.89340*** 
 [2.01] [1.98] [-3.11] [-3.06] 
ci 0.13974*** 0.14008*** 0.06159* 0.06256* 
 [5.76] [5.78] [1.80] [1.83] 
size 0.01361*** 0.01371*** 0.01669*** 0.01664*** 
 [6.88] [6.93] [6.12] [6.10] 
nim -2.27763*** -2.24750*** -1.88134*** -1.91011*** 
 [-7.00] [-6.88] [-4.06] [-4.10] 
nwr 0.14282** 0.14308** 0.25062*** 0.24921*** 
 [2.29] [2.29] [3.04] [3.02] 
npl 0.06425 0.05830 0.25792 0.26306 
 [0.35] [0.32] [0.97] [0.99] 
ldr -0.13353*** -0.13461*** -0.25713*** -0.25639*** 
 [-8.94] [-8.98] [-12.61] [-12.55] 
dgdp 0.00434*** 0.00440*** -0.00090 -0.00089 
 [5.01] [5.07] [-0.76] [-0.75] 
hpi -0.03638** -0.03422* -0.08626*** -0.08702*** 
 [-2.07] [-1.96] [-3.49] [-3.54] 
unem -0.00034 0.00016 -0.00668** -0.00708*** 
 [-0.19] [0.09] [-2.52] [-2.60] 
pcpi 0.03679* 0.04027** -0.03212 -0.03539 
 [1.85] [1.98] [-1.14] [-1.24] 
hhi 0.09071 
 
-0.02902 
 
 [1.46] 
 
[-0.31] 
 
rate -0.01952*** -0.01931*** -0.02169*** -0.02190*** 
 [-10.18] [-9.97] [-8.64] [-8.67] 
crisis -0.08194*** -0.08280*** -0.04225*** -0.04136*** 
 [-12.58] [-12.61] [-4.80] [-4.63] 
postcrisis -0.05460*** -0.05641*** -0.00365 -0.00207 
 [-5.98] [-6.05] [-0.24] [-0.14] 
est 
 
-0.00428 
 
0.00247 
 
 
[-1.58] 
 
[0.68] 
Constant -0.36242** -0.35920** 0.71287*** 0.72297*** 
 [-2.05] [-2.05] [2.88] [2.94] 
 
    
Observations 2,882 2,882 1,906 1,906 
R-squared 0.246 0.246 0.262 0.262 
Adjusted R-squared 0.242 0.242 0.255 0.255 
Ftest 55.08 55.10 39.33 39.36 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.8. Regression analysis of changes in loan portfolio (post-3-year and post-5-yr 
change) 
The sample includes all the mergers and their matching pairs. dX_3/dX_5 represents for the change loan portfolio of a 
credit union between t-1 and t+3/t-1 and t+5. Xs are each loan type. ucc is unsecured credit card loans, oul is other 
unsecured loans, nvl is new vehicle loans, uvl is used vehicle loans, fm is first mortgages, orel is other real estate loans, 
bl is business loans. Independent variables are all measured in one year prior to the merger (t-1). Merger is a dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if credit union experienced a merger in that year and cross is a dummy variable that equals to 1 
if the merger is a cross-state one. Roa is return on asset; ci is cost-income ratio, nwr is net worth ratio, nim is net interest 
margin, npl is non-performing loan ratio, ldr is loan-to-deposit ratio, size is natural logarithm of total asset,dgdp is GDP 
growth rate, hpi is housing price index, unem is unemployment rate, pcpi is per capita personal income, hhi is Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of deposits in each state, rate is interest rate, crisis is a dummy variable which is 1 for 2008-2010, 
postcrisis is a dummy variable which is 1 after 2010, and est is number of establishments in the state. T-statistics in 
brackets.  
Panel A. Regression analysis of changes in unsecured loans 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  change in unsecured credit cards change in other unsecured loans 
VARIABLES ducc_3 ducc_3 ducc_5 ducc_5 doul_3 doul_3 doul_5 doul_5 
  
        
merger 0.00087 0.00086 0.00026 0.00030 0.00090 0.00089 0.00111 0.00121 
 [1.03] [1.01] [0.19] [0.22] [0.52] [0.51] [0.44] [0.48] 
cross 0.00044 0.00050 -0.00164 -0.00128 -0.00737 -0.00726 -0.00435 -0.00339 
 [0.16] [0.18] [-0.37] [-0.29] [-1.31] [-1.29] [-0.52] [-0.41] 
roa -0.04306 -0.03927 0.29513** 0.31031** -0.01379 -0.00728 0.18368 0.22555 
 [-0.49] [-0.45] [2.07] [2.18] [-0.08] [-0.04] [0.69] [0.85] 
ci -0.00480 -0.00460 -0.00031 0.00064 0.00300 0.00339 0.00423 0.00676 
 [-1.00] [-0.96] [-0.04] [0.08] [0.30] [0.34] [0.29] [0.46] 
size -0.00224*** -0.00225*** -0.00365*** -0.00367*** -0.00045 -0.00046 -0.00409*** -0.00414*** 
 [-5.71] [-5.73] [-5.80] [-5.82] [-0.55] [-0.57] [-3.48] [-3.52] 
nim 
-0.22917*** -0.23278*** -0.48566*** -0.49900*** -0.51351*** -
0.51880*** 
-0.86859*** -0.90652*** 
 [-3.55] [-3.59] [-4.55] [-4.65] [-3.84] [-3.87] [-4.36] [-4.53] 
nwr 0.02563** 0.02542** 0.03483* 0.03395* 0.05310** 0.05270** 0.06929* 0.06687* 
 [2.07] [2.05] [1.83] [1.78] [2.07] [2.06] [1.95] [1.88] 
npl 0.08065** 0.08128** 0.07980 0.08297 0.06741 0.06830 -0.01145 -0.00269 
 [2.22] [2.23] [1.31] [1.36] [0.90] [0.91] [-0.10] [-0.02] 
ldr 0.00489* 0.00509* 0.00934** 0.00972** -0.00336 -0.00304 0.01180 0.01289 
 [1.65] [1.71] [1.98] [2.06] [-0.55] [-0.49] [1.34] [1.47] 
dgdp 0.00028 0.00027 0.00037 0.00037 -0.00039 -0.00039 -0.00043 -0.00042 
 [1.61] [1.59] [1.34] [1.35] [-1.10] [-1.10] [-0.85] [-0.83] 
hpi 0.02285*** 0.02316*** 0.02535*** 0.02564*** 0.00700 0.00771 0.01779* 0.01841* 
 [6.55] [6.68] [4.45] [4.52] [0.97] [1.07] [1.67] [1.74] 
unem 0.00138*** 0.00130*** 0.00197*** 0.00171*** 0.00126* 0.00114 0.00118 0.00045 
 [3.93] [3.54] [3.22] [2.72] [1.73] [1.50] [1.03] [0.39] 
pcpi -0.01217*** -0.01300*** -0.00503 -0.00715 0.00777 0.00637 -0.00602 -0.01184 
 [-3.09] [-3.23] [-0.78] [-1.08] [0.95] [0.76] [-0.50] [-0.96] 
hhi 0.00792 
 
0.01308 
 
0.01998 
 
0.02883 
 
 [0.64] 
 
[0.61] 
 
[0.79] 
 
[0.73] 
 
rate 0.00029 0.00024 0.00090 0.00076 -0.00049 -0.00058 0.00016 -0.00024 
 [0.77] [0.62] [1.56] [1.29] [-0.62] [-0.73] [0.15] [-0.22] 
crisis 0.00808*** 0.00819*** 0.00557*** 0.00604*** 0.00469* 0.00485* 0.00924** 0.01056*** 
 [6.26] [6.29] [2.74] [2.93] [1.76] [1.80] [2.44] [2.75] 
postcrisis 0.00304* 0.00330* -0.00574* -0.00475 0.00263 0.00304 0.00568 0.00841 
 [1.68] [1.79] [-1.66] [-1.36] [0.70] [0.79] [0.88] [1.29] 
est 
 
0.00014 
 
0.00072 
 
0.00004 
 
0.00217 
 
 
[0.26] 
 
[0.85] 
 
[0.03] 
 
[1.38] 
Constant 0.04662 0.05307 -0.01693 -0.00279 -0.10438 -0.09191 0.05144 0.08867 
 [1.33] [1.53] [-0.30] [-0.05] [-1.44] [-1.28] [0.48] [0.84] 
 
        
Observations 2,882 2,882 1,906 1,906 2,882 2,882 1,906 1,906 
R-squared 0.071 0.071 0.069 0.069 0.034 0.034 0.037 0.038 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.0651 0.0650 0.0604 0.0606 0.0283 0.0281 0.0282 0.0289 
Ftest 12.81 12.79 8.205 8.227 5.941 5.904 4.252 4.336 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.33e-08 7.69e-09 
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Panel B. Regression analysis of change in vehicle loans.   (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  change in new vehicle loans change in used vehicle loans 
VARIABLES dnvl_3 dnvl_3 dnvl_5 dnvl_5 duvl_3 duvl_3 duvl_5 duvl_5 
  
        
merger -0.00558** -0.00547** -0.00110 -0.00099 -0.00531 -0.00537 -0.00291 -0.00282 
 [-2.06] [-2.02] [-0.28] [-0.25] [-1.57] [-1.59] [-0.60] [-0.59] 
cross -0.00626 -0.00681 -0.00546 -0.00604 -0.00205 -0.00165 -0.00564 -0.00520 
 [-0.72] [-0.79] [-0.42] [-0.47] [-0.19] [-0.15] [-0.36] [-0.33] 
roa -0.52656* -0.55978** -0.74606* -0.78839* -0.07703 -0.05382 -0.05679 -0.04159 
 [-1.88] [-2.00] [-1.81] [-1.91] [-0.22] [-0.15] [-0.11] [-0.08] 
ci -0.05973*** -0.06016*** -0.07070*** -0.07233*** 0.01787 0.01924 0.10556*** 0.10671*** 
 [-3.89] [-3.92] [-3.10] [-3.17] [0.93] [1.00] [3.78] [3.82] 
size 0.00554*** 0.00570*** 0.00744*** 0.00753*** 0.00367** 0.00363** 0.00251 0.00250 
 [4.42] [4.55] [4.08] [4.13] [2.34] [2.31] [1.12] [1.12] 
nim 0.78955*** 0.84288*** 0.43553 0.48782 -0.02769 -0.04723 -1.87481*** -1.88516*** 
 [3.83] [4.07] [1.41] [1.57] [-0.11] [-0.18] [-4.95] [-4.96] 
nwr -0.05570 -0.05444 -0.03144 -0.02893 0.10686** 0.10545** 0.04867 0.04781 
 [-1.41] [-1.38] [-0.57] [-0.53] [2.16] [2.13] [0.72] [0.71] 
npl 0.17587 0.16571 0.39569** 0.38654** -0.01082 -0.00751 0.52471** 0.52782** 
 [1.51] [1.43] [2.24] [2.19] [-0.07] [-0.05] [2.43] [2.44] 
ldr -0.04407*** -0.04628*** -0.04398*** -0.04531*** -0.06736*** -0.06620*** -0.01913 -0.01880 
 [-4.65] [-4.88] [-3.23] [-3.33] [-5.69] [-5.57] [-1.15] [-1.13] 
dgdp -0.00170*** -0.00161*** -0.00307*** -0.00309*** -0.00077 -0.00077 -0.00062 -0.00061 
 [-3.09] [-2.93] [-3.88] [-3.90] [-1.12] [-1.12] [-0.63] [-0.63] 
hpi -0.11139*** -0.11002*** -0.13916*** -0.13762*** -0.02487* -0.02249 0.04536** 0.04612** 
 [-9.98] [-9.94] [-8.44] [-8.39] [-1.78] [-1.62] [2.25] [2.29] 
unem -0.00193* -0.00096 -0.00357** -0.00286 0.00300** 0.00256* 0.00505** 0.00479** 
 [-1.71] [-0.81] [-2.02] [-1.58] [2.14] [1.74] [2.33] [2.15] 
pcpi 0.03356*** 0.04150*** 0.07187*** 0.07766*** 0.00837 0.00335 -0.04916** -0.05129** 
 [2.67] [3.22] [3.83] [4.08] [0.53] [0.21] [-2.14] [-2.20] 
hhi 0.07932** 
 
0.05956 
 
0.06668 
 
0.03223 
 
 [2.02] 
 
[0.97] 
 
[1.36] 
 
[0.43] 
 
rate -0.01001*** -0.00951*** -0.00894*** -0.00857*** 0.00674*** 0.00642*** 0.00612*** 0.00596*** 
 [-8.23] [-7.76] [-5.34] [-5.09] [4.43] [4.18] [2.98] [2.89] 
crisis -0.02765*** -0.02917*** 0.00302 0.00143 0.05351*** 0.05408*** 0.04572*** 0.04614*** 
 [-6.70] [-7.02] [0.51] [0.24] [10.36] [10.38] [6.35] [6.32] 
postcrisis 0.01422** 0.01083* 0.04697*** 0.04418*** 0.05366*** 0.05514*** 0.02162* 0.02260* 
 [2.46] [1.83] [4.70] [4.36] [7.41] [7.45] [1.77] [1.82] 
est 
 
-0.00596*** 
 
-0.00461* 
 
0.00027 
 
0.00020 
 
 
[-3.47] 
 
[-1.89] 
 
[0.13] 
 
[0.07] 
Constant 0.14901 0.12521 -0.15117 -0.16708 -0.06181 -0.01833 0.20578 0.22462 
 [1.33] [1.13] [-0.91] [-1.02] [-0.44] [-0.13] [1.02] [1.12]          
Observations 2,882 2,882 1,906 1,906 2,882 2,882 1,906 1,906 
R-squared 0.201 0.203 0.153 0.154 0.115 0.115 0.102 0.102 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.196 0.198 0.146 0.147 0.110 0.110 0.0943 0.0942 
Ftest 42.27 42.85 20.09 20.27 21.99 21.87 12.67 12.65 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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 Panel C. Regression analysis of change in real estate loans and business loans 
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Table A.9. Merger effect: the differences in changes of performance/credit supply/loan 
portfolio/average loan and deposit interest rate of the merged and the matching groups 
We calculate the merger effect by subtracting matching groups’ numbers from merger 
groups’ numbers.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Merger Effect 
  roa 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 -0.00004 -0.11 0.9104 
5yr 788 0.000113 0.3 0.7671 
 
ci 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 -0.00266 -0.72 0.4707 
5yr 788 -0.00199 -0.38 0.7041 
 
tl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 -0.00234 -0.52 0.6044 
5yr 788 -0.00158 -0.23 0.8151 
 
ucc 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 0.000722 0.82 0.4103 
5yr 788 0.000328 0.22 0.8256 
 
oul 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 -0.00031 -0.18 0.8554 
5yr 788 -0.00002 -0.01 0.9939 
 
nvl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 -0.00441 -1.6 0.1102 
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5yr 788 0.00209 0.5 0.619 
 
uvl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 -0.00473 -1.36 0.1741 
5yr 788 -0.00369 -0.71 0.4749 
 
fm 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 -0.003 -0.74 0.4595 
5yr 788 0.00149 0.26 0.7956 
 
orel 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 -0.00051 -0.19 0.8472 
5yr 788 0.00193 0.52 0.6029 
 
bl 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 0.000891 0.62 0.5321 
5yr 788 0.00444** 2 0.0461 
 
loan_rate 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 -0.00043 -1.35 0.1788 
5yr 788 -0.00017 -0.38 0.7077 
 
depo_rate 
# of yrs post-merger N Merger effect t stats p-value 
3yr 1273 -0.00015 -0.64 0.5227 
5yr 788 -0.00068** -2.17 0.0305 
 
 
